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S H O R T A R T I C L EThe Effects of District Magnitude
on Voting Behavior
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science
Rafael Hortala-Vallve, London School of Economics and Political Science
Guillem Riambau-Armet, Yale–NUS CollegeIs there more sincere voting in multi-member districts than in single-member districts? Existing research on this
question is inconclusive, at least in part because it is difﬁcult with observational data to isolate the effect of district
magnitude on voting behavior independently from voters’ preferences or the number of parties. Hence, we investigate
this issue in a laboratory experiment, where we vary district magnitude while keeping the distribution of voters’
preferences and the number of parties constant. We ﬁnd that voting for the preferred party (sincere voting) increases
with district magnitude. This is consistent with existing ﬁndings from observational data. We also discover a surprising
result: a high incidence of “frontrunner” voting, which cannot be easily explained by existing research.The design of electoral systems is a salient policy con-cern for new democracies as well as many advanceddemocracies. One key issue is the ideal district mag-
nitude (DM henceforth): the number of candidates to be
elected in each district. Between 2012 and 2016, for example,
Romania considered switching from large multi-member
districts to single-member districts, Israel considered switch-
ing from a single national multi-member district to smaller
multi-member districts, Tunisia introduced small multi-
member districts for its ﬁrst democratic elections, while Chile
decided to replace two-member districts with medium-sized
multi-member districts. What are the consequences of DM in
terms of voter behavior?
Cox (1997) suggests that as DM increases, the propor-
tion of voters who behave strategically decreases, while the
proportion who votes sincerely for their most preferred
party increases. This argument is similar to a claim made
by Sartori (1968, 279) much earlier: “The general rule is
that the progression frommaximal manipulative impact [via
strategic voting] to sheer ineffectiveness follows, more thanSimon Hix (s.hix@lse.ac.uk) is Harold Laski Professor of Political Science, Lond
WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Rafael Hortala-Vallve is associate professor in po
cal Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Guillem
16 College Ave W, 01-220, 138527, Singapore.
Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in
/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at h
The Journal of Politics, volume 79, number 1. Published online November 8, 20
q 2016 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-
This content downloaded from 158.14
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms anything else, the size of the constituency.”However, there is
some observational research which suggests that we should
observe similar proportions of strategic voting under pro-
portional representation and single-member districts (Abram-
son et al. 2010). We investigate the effect of DM on voting
behavior via a laboratory experiment designed to isolate the
motivations behind voter choices. In most observational
studies, the effect of district magnitude on voting behavior is
difﬁcult to isolate because the number of parties and the
distribution of voters’ preferences varies with district mag-
nitude (both within and across countries), and voters often
consider post-election coalition bargaining when voting. So,
in our experimental setup, we keep constant the distribution
of voters’ preferences and the number of parties and exclude
post-election bargaining. We build our analysis on two stylized
types of behavior: (1) sincere behavior, where a person votes
for the party that yields the highest utility regardless of infor-
mation about the electoral chances of the party and (2) strategic
behavior, where a person also takes into account the viability
of parties when deciding whom to vote for. We deﬁne voterson School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London
litical science and public policy, London School of Economics and Politi
Riambau-Armet is assistant professor of economics, Yale–NUS College








Volume 79 Number 1 January 2017 / 357as being strategic when they act “in accordance with both
their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of
the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in
contention for victory” (Myerson and Weber 1993, 135). In
contrast with some of the previous literature, we do not
deﬁne being strategic as being nonsincere: a strategic subject
is one who votes for the party that maximizes her expected
utility, which may or may not also be the sincere choice. In
order to compute expected utilities, subjects need to consider
the viability of candidates; just as pre-election polls serve to
inform the electorate about the relative chances of the
candidates (Fey 1997), in our multi-election setting, past
voting behavior helps voters form expectations on their
chances of inﬂuencing the outcome. Consistent with ob-
servational studies and some existing lab experiments, we
ﬁnd that sincere voting increases with DM. However,
whereas DMp 1 and DMp 2 have similar levels of sincere
voting, this behavior nearly doubles as DM increases to 3.
Instead, strategic behavior decreases as soon as DM is “more
than 1.”
Even though the main focus of our analysis is to under-
stand sincere vis-à-vis strategic voting, consistently across
treatments, we ﬁnd a third pattern of behavior: voting for the
winner of the previous round. Since we cannot impute sin-
cere or strategic behavior to votes that are simply a vote for
the frontrunner, we incorporate this type of voting in our
analysis to not introduce biases in our results.
THE EXPERIMENT
Our experiment consists of four treatments, each corre-
sponding to a different DM: a single-member district
(DM p 1), a two-member district (DM p 2), a three-
member district (DM p 3), and pure proportional repre-
sentation (PR). Subjects belong to a group of 25 subjects1
and participate in 60 elections by casting a single vote for
one of ﬁve parties.2 In the DM p 1 treatment, a candidate
from the party that receives the most votes is elected, and
each subject receives a payoff from the election equivalent
to his or her utility for that party. In the DMp 2 andDMp 3
treatments, we apply a form of closed-list proportional rep-
resentation, where seats are allocated to the parties in pro-
portion to their vote shares (using the Sainte-Laguë divisor
method), and each subject receives a payoff from the election1. Because some participants did not show up on time some groups
had slightly fewer participants (see table B1 in app. B). Instructions were
modiﬁed accordingly.
2. Casting a vote for a single party is the most common ballot
structure in single-member as well as multi-member districts in national
parliamentary elections in democracies (Reynolds and Steenbergen 2006).
This content downloaded from 158.14
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms equivalent to his or her utility for the party of each candidate
who is elected. Finally, in the PR treatment, we assume that
parties win seats in direct proportion to votes and each subject
receives a payoff proportional to the share of votes each party
receives. This speciﬁcation of payoffs allows us to identify the
strategic incentives of voters as we modify DM while leaving
aside coalition formation considerations. This last aspect is
indeed important and has received a great deal of interest (see,
e.g., Duch and Armstrong 2010; Kedar 2012) yet is out of the
scope of this paper.
Each of our 212 subjects participated in a single treat-
ment (always voted in an electoral system with the same
DM) during 60 elections—there are 12,720 observations. In
all treatments, the utility that subjects derived from each of
the parties was privately announced. Every ﬁve periods,
subjects’ preferences were redrawn. We discuss the speciﬁc
details of the overall distribution of preferences in appendix C
(apps. A–I available online). For our purposes what really
matters is that subjects never observe other voters’ preferences.
After each election aggregate results are publicly announced
but individual payoffs are private information: voters can only
work out the distribution of preferences by observing past
voting behavior. Implicit in this feature of our experiment is
that we want subjects to condition their voting decisions solely
on their own preferences and aggregate past voting behavior.
The same procedure was used in all sessions.3 Instruc-
tions (see app. A) were read aloud and questions answered
in private. Students were asked to answer a questionnaire to
check that they fully understood the experimental design,
the seat-allocation method, and the payoff structure for
their particular treatment group. If any of their answers
were wrong, we referred the participant to the section of the
instructions where the correct answer was provided. Stu-
dents were isolated and could not communicate with each
other.
In the ﬁrst election each participant was shown a screen
with their utility from each of the ﬁve parties and was asked
to cast a single vote for one of the parties. Abstention was
not allowed. The participants were then informed of the
outcome of the ﬁrst election: the number of votes each
party received, which candidate(s) was (were) elected, and
the payoff they received from the election. The participants
were then asked to vote again for one of the parties. This3. No subject participated in more than one session. Students were
recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004),
and the experiment took place on networked personal computers in
Centre for Experimental Social Sciences at Nufﬁeld College, Oxford, in
November 2011. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
3.037.181 on March 01, 2017 09:07:41 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
4. Forsythe et al. (1993) is the only experimental work we are aware of
that uses past election information as the cue from which voters form
expectations about their probability of being pivotal.
5. The literature disagrees on what should be referred to as strategic
voting. Similar to us, Kawai and Watanabe (2013) and Cho (2014) con-
sider a voter to be strategic when his or her action maximizes expected
utility (regardless of this action being sincere or not); instead, the em-
pirical political behavior literature only classiﬁes a voter to be strategic
when his or her vote maximizes expected utility and is not sincere. In
appendix E we show that all our results are robust to considering either
deﬁnition.
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we assigned seats, and we informed participants about the
outcome of the election and their payoff—was repeated for
ﬁve elections. Then, after ﬁve elections, the participants’
preferences were redrawn and the participants interacted
for a further ﬁve elections, after which the preferences were
redrawn again. In other words the experiment was orga-
nized as 12 sets of ﬁve rounds (60 elections in total), and
after each set of elections, participants’ preferences and party
labels were redrawn.
At the end of the last election, the computer randomly
selected four elections, and subjects were paid the proﬁts
they obtained in those four elections and a show-up fee of 3
GBP. At the end of each session, participants were asked to
ﬁll in a questionnaire on the computer and were given their
ﬁnal payment in private. Session length, including waiting
time and payment, was around 90 minutes. The average
payment was 15.71 GBP (approximately US$26).
AGGREGATE RESULTS
As an illustration of our results, table 1 shows the outcomes
of elections 11–15 for one of the groups in each treatment
(we report the votes received by each of the ﬁve parties
and the candidates assigned to each party). The results with
DM p 1 show voters coordinating around the ﬁrst two
parties, A and B, with support for the other three parties de-
clining over time. This suggests a high proportion of strategic
behavior, with voters whose preferred party was C, D, or E
realizing that their most preferred party had no chance of
winning. When DMp 2, voters appear to settle around three
parties (A, B, and C) as Cox (1997) would have predicted. In
contrast, when DMp 3, party C ran away with the election
after a few rounds and there seems to be a ﬁght for the last seat.
Finally, in the fully proportional treatment group, there were
considerable shifts in voting patterns, despite the fact that the
optimal behavior for each participant in this treatment is
always to vote sincerely: recall that there are no post-electionThis content downloaded from 158.14
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms coalitional concerns in our experimental design and voters’
payoff solely depends on the distribution of votes in the PR
treatment.
In what follows we classify a vote as sincere when the
subject votes for his or her most preferred party, the one
that yields maximum payment if elected. A strategic vote is
instead a vote in which the subject not only considers his or
her preferences for all parties but also the likelihood that
his or her vote will be pivotal—we compute expected utili-
ties and assume that a strategic subject votes for the party
that maximizes expected utility. In appendix D we offer a
detailed explanation of the computation of expected utili-
ties when voting for each party. For this purpose we build
on Myerson and Weber (1993) and consider that our
subjects best respond to previous period play by assuming
that the probability that any other player votes for each of
the parties coincides with the previous period frequency of
votes.4 As stated above, our deﬁnitions allow a voter to be
simultaneously strategic and sincere: the optimal action
may consist of voting toward the subjects’ preferred party.5
The frequency of sincere and/or strategic voting behavior in
our four treatments is shown in table 2. The long-standing
hypothesis in the electoral studies literature that sincere
voting should increase with DM seems to ﬁnd little support
in our aggregated data when comparing our three non-
fully-proportional treatments.Table 1. Sample of Election Results for Each TreatmentElection DM p 1 DM p 23.037.181 
and CondiDM p 3on March 01, 2017 09:07:4
tions (http://www.journals.PR11 (6,7*,4,4,3) (7*,6,6*,3,3) (5*,5*,6*,4,4) (5,6,3,6,4)
12 (7,12*,4,1,0) (8*,7,8*,1,1) (4*,7*,10*,1,2) (6,7,3,5,3)
13 (8,12*,3,1,0) (7,8*,7*,1,2) (4*,3,16**,0,1) (9,7,2,4,2)
14 (8,14*,2,0,0) (7,8*,8*,0,2) (6*,3,13**,1,1) (11,6,1,5,1)
15 (9,14*,1,0,0) (7,8*,8*,1,1) (3,4*,14**,2,1) (13,5,2,3,1)Note. In each cell we indicate the votes received by parties A, B, C, D, and E (respectively) and we identify
with one or two stars: * the parties that obtained one candidate, ** the parties that obtained two candidates,
respectively.1 AM
uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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as we increase DM from 1 to 3. We expected the opposite
because when DM increases it is more likely that a strategic
vote coincides with a sincere one. This increased coinci-
dence in both types of voting is captured in the last row of
the table, where the “predicted” values are the percentage of
observations where voting sincerely for the most preferred
party in an election can also be classiﬁed as a strategic vote
for the party that maximizes the expected payoff.
Something that seems puzzling in table 2 is the huge
difference between the percentage of observations that are
both sincere and strategic and the situations that are pre-
dicted to be so. In situations in which both sincere and
strategic actions coincide, the voter should have no conﬂict
about supporting his preferred party. However, we observe
that around a 20% of subjects fail to choose this action
when it is optimal to do so. For whom are they voting? To
our surprise we see that 50% of the subjects who did not
vote for their most preferred party (when sincere and stra-
tegic actions coincide) voted instead for the party that
obtained the most votes in the previous election round—
the frontrunner. When adding this third type of behavior to
being sincere or strategic, we can classify more than 90% of
all vote choices in our data.
Voting for the frontrunner in our setup is only deﬁned
for election rounds 2, 3, 4, and 5 given that in the ﬁrst
election (round 1) preferences have been redrawn and there
is no previous period of play with the same preferences.
Voting for the frontrunner is usually rationalized in terms
of herding (Ali and Kartik 2012), information aggregation
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997), or favoring a stable
governing party (Riambau 2016). However, there is no
room for such rationalizations in our private values setup.
Further evidence toward frontrunner behavior is found in
our control treatment, with a fully proportional electoral
system, where voting sincerely is the dominant strategy
(i.e., sincere and strategic votes always coincide).
An important issue when analyzing our data (as with
actual voting data) is that many observations can be si-This content downloaded from 158.14
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms multaneously classiﬁed as more than one type. Consider,
for instance, a subject whose preferred party is also the one
that obtained most votes in the previous period when DM
is 1. In this situation, when the subject votes expressively,
she or he is also voting for the frontrunner and most likely
her or his vote also coincides with her or his strategic ac-
tion. Table 3 shows the subsample of observations in which
the three types of actions do not coincide.6
The last row in the table shows yet another manifesta-
tion of a mechanical effect of DM: as DM increases it is
more likely that the sincere and strategic actions coincide;
thus our sample becomes thinner. We are now only con-
sidering less than 7% of our observations yet we see that
sincere voting is greater when DM is 3 rather than 1, and
strategic voting decreases. Possibly due to the increased
complexity of the voting rule we see frontrunner voting and
“other” types of behavior increasing when DM is larger
than 1.
Tables 3 and 4 both indicate the heterogeneous effects
of DM in our population. If all subjects were sincere, we
should observe 100% of observations as sincere, while stra-
tegic voting should increase with DM (due to the increased
coincidence between sincere and strategic voting), and front-
runner voting should remain unchanged. Instead, if all sub-
jects were strategic, sincere voting should increase with DM,
strategic voting should always be at 100%, and frontrunner
voting should decrease with DM, because more parties be-
come viable so less voters end up favoring the frontrunner
candidate. In the next section, we analyze in detail individual
voting decisions, to understand whether and how DM has a
systematic effect on the individual behavior of subjects.
STRATEGIC VERSUS SINCERE TYPES
We follow a similar strategy to Duch and Armstrong (2010)
to estimate the proportion of each type of voter. We as-Table 3. Frequency of Types of Behavior by Treatment When
Sincere, Strategic, and Frontrunner Do Not Coincide6. Duch and Armstr
sample.
3.037.181 on March 01, 2
and Conditions (http://wwDM p 1ong (2010) restrict t
017 09:07:41 AM
w.journals.uchicagDM p 2heir analysis to suc
o.edu/t-and-c).DM p 3% sincere 14.4 12.4 22.5
% strategic 70.5 53.7 42.8
% frontrunner 7.4 24.8 22.5
% other 7.7 9.2 12.3
Observations 312 218 138Table 2. Frequency of Types of Behavior by TreatmentDM p 1 DM p 2 DM p 3 PR% sincere 70.5 72.4 72.7 89.8
% strategic 84.2 74.1 70.5 89.8
% observed both 64.5 67.0 66.6 89.8
% predicted both 72.5 85.5 91.2 100h a disjointNote. “Observed both”: a vote is both sincere and strategic. “Predicted
both”: the sincere vote and the strategic vote coincide.
360 / District Magnitude on Voting Behavior Simon Hix, Rafael Hortala-Vallve, and Guillem Riambau-Armetsume a strategic type’s utility (alternatively, sincere or front-
runner)7 follows a standard conditional logit function. In this
way, we can estimate how responsive subjects are to payoff
differences when casting their vote. Our goal is to estimate the
probability that the vote of individual i in election t is of type
strategic, sincere, or frontrunner. We estimate these proba-
bilities using the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm.
We report the average of all such probabilities across types
and rounds and, as standard in the mixture models litera-
ture, interpret it as the proportion of votes of each type in
the population. To compute these probabilities, we start by
making an educated guess for the average responsiveness to
payoff differences across individuals, as well as the uncon-
ditional probability an individual is of a particular type. We
then construct a standard likelihood function which allows
us to compute the conditional probability that each single
vote in our experiment is of each type. We then plug these
values back into the likelihood function and get updated
estimates for our parameters of interest. This once again
feeds back into new updated individual conditional proba-
bilities, which allows us to update the likelihood function, and
so on. We iterate this process until convergence. For a detailed
account of our estimation, see appendix G.
Table 4 reports the results. For each DM we report the
percentage of individuals classiﬁed as being of each type
and the percentage of correct vote predictions (reported
95% conﬁdence intervals are computed using bootstrap-
ping, with 1,000 replications). The estimated proportion of
sincere types sharply increases between DM p 2 and
DM p 3. Instead, the estimated proportion of strategic
types goes down with DM: being aware of the viability of7. Our analysis focuses on the comparison between sincere and stra-
tegic types yet, as discussed earlier, we would be biasing our results if we
did not consider the possibility of subjects voting for the frontrunner.
This content downloaded from 158.14
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms the different parties becomes too difﬁcult and psychological
effects kick in. Hence, subjects become less strategic.8
A possible explanation of the above results is that for a
small increase from DMp 1 to DMp 2 voters might still
want to engage in strategic thinking but make mistakes that
result in their casting a vote we cannot rationalize. As DM
becomes even larger, some voters seem to entirely give up
on strategic thinking and vote sincerely. Some of our sub-
jects did not vote for their preferred party in the ﬁrst round
of elections when there was no information about (pre-
vious) aggregate turnout. Dropping these subjects rein-
forces our ﬁndings—appendix F contains various robust-
ness checks.
As noted above, one of the main issues with our ex-
perimental design is that many actions are observationally
equivalent. As a robustness check, we estimate the pro-
portion of types in the subsample where the three types of
action do not coincide and ﬁnd support for our previous
ﬁndings. Our results are also robust to considering the al-
ternative deﬁnition of strategic voting as a strategic and
nonsincere vote—see appendix E. There is yet another way
to classify strategic behavior by focussing on the last seat
assigned: vote toward last winner versus ﬁrst loser (see Cox
1994). This different way to rationalize strategic behavior
is not that different from the one we have considered in
the text: both criteria coincide in their classiﬁcation in
76% of our observations. Thus, it does not come as a sur-
prise that results presented in the paper are robust to this
different speciﬁcation. Finally, in appendix I we regress our
estimated probability of being strategic on the usual socio-
demographic characteristics (age, gender, experience in ex-Table 4. Proportion of Subjects of Each TypeDM p 13




nd Conditions (httpDM p 3proportional tre
. In other treatmen
ic votes coincide.
 01, 2017 09:07:4
://www.journals.uPR% sincere 19.99 20.41 35.86
(17.5, 21.9) (17.2, 25) (30.6,41.2) 86.06% strategic 71.04 63.73 53.89 (84.9,88.4)
(69.3, 73.85) (60.2, 68.4) (48.1,58.5)% frontrunner 8.97 15.86 10.25 13.94
(7.6, 10.1) (7.4, 18.3) (8.8,12.6) (11.6,15.1)% correctly predicted votes 91.32 79.58 78.24 92.38
Observations 2,304 2,400 3,360 2,112Note. Sincere and strategic actions coincide in PR. 95% conﬁdence intervals in parentheses.atment both sincere and strategic
ts we dropped the ﬁrst rounds when
1 AM
chicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 79 Number 1 January 2017 / 361periments, studies, nationality) yet ﬁnd no signiﬁcant re-
lationship.
Finally, we compare the ﬁt of our three types model with
models hitherto used in the literature by looking at the
predictive power (percentage of correctly predicted obser-
vations) of different approaches. We consider the condi-
tional logit model, the mixed logit model, and a two types
model. Our approach consistently improves predictions by
at least 30% (see appendix J).
CONCLUSION
A widely held assumption in political science is that non-
sincere voting should be lower in higher-magnitude dis-
tricts. We designed a lab experiment to isolate this effect and
found that sincere voting increases with DM. There is a
mechanical component to this effect: as DM increases, the
proportion of voters who ﬁnd that their most preferred
party yields the highest expected utility increases. However,
not all of this increase in sincere voting is due to amechanical
effect, as strategic voting decreases with DM. So, part of the
increase in sincere voting is due to voters changing their
strategy. The source of these effects remains a fruitful area
for future research.
We also discover a surprising regularity: in more than
10% of our observations subjects vote for the frontrunner
irrespective of DM. As Hinich (1981) points out, “voting
for the winner is no less plausible than the assumption that
voters believe they can be pivotal.” To understand which
subjects vote for the frontrunner, we replicate the analysis
in the previous section and regress the probability of being
a frontrunner on personal characteristics yet ﬁnd no sig-
niﬁcant effects. In short, we do not fully understand the
psychological motivations behind such behavior, yet we
contend that this form of voting behavior should be taken
more seriously in future theoretical and empirical research.
In terms of external validity, there are, of course, many
other factors that come into play in “real” elections, such as
parties changing positions if the electoral system changes
and voters thinking about government formation expecta-
tions when casting their vote. Nonetheless, we believe that
we can draw some general inferences from our results. In
particular, our results are consistent with previous research
that suggests that a change from a single-member district
electoral system to a low-magnitude form of PR would sig-
niﬁcantly increase the proportion of voters who would
choose to vote for their most preferred party rather than
to vote for their second- or third-best option.This content downloaded from 158.14
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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